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than 10% p.a. after controlling for traditional risk factors. The effect is
most pronounced in firms that are characterized by large managerial
discretion of the CEO. The abnormal returns we document are one
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1 Introduction
CEOs often own a significant fraction of the outstanding stocks of the firms
they work for. In 2000, 18% of the CEOs of S&P 1500 firms voluntarily
held 5% or more of their company’s stocks. These holdings of own company
stocks usually constitute a dominant fraction of the CEO’s personal wealth.
This pronounced voluntary portfolio concentration is puzzling, as it entails
costs in terms of foregone diversification (Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia
(1991) and Kahl, Liu, and Longstaff (2003)).
We offer a simple new explanation for this puzzle: Managers invest in
their own firms because it is a good (long term) investment for them. To test
this explanation, we empirically examine the following question: do stocks
of firms in which the CEO holds a large fraction of the firms’ outstanding
shares (owner CEOs) generate positive abnormal returns?
We analyze this question by examining the returns of S&P 500 and S&P
1500 firms for the periods 1994 to 2005 and 1996 to 2005, respectively. Our
paper departs from the literature in that it documents that portfolios con-
sisting of firms with owner CEOs significantly outperform the market.1 For
example, a value-weighted portfolio consisting of all S&P 500 (S&P 1500)
firms in which the CEO holds more than 10% of the company’s stocks de-
livers abnormal returns of 13% p.a. (12% p.a.). This result holds after con-
trolling for the influence of the three Fama and French (1993) factors as well
1There are many studies that examine the impact of CEO ownership on firm value and
operational performance (see, e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), McConnell and
Servaes (1990), and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991)).
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as the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) momentum factor. These findings are
robust to several specifications. We also find similar evidence in a stock-level
multivariate analysis that takes into account other firm-specific characteris-
tics that might drive returns. Our findings help to explain why CEOs invest
in their own firms.
The question why CEOs are invested in their own firms has been dis-
cussed elsewhere in the literature, and several other answers are suggested.
One prominent explanation is based on asymmetric information. Insiders
of firms are often better informed as far as firm value is concerned than
other investors. Hence, it may be in the interest of the CEO to trade in
her firm’s stock if she has access to private information. For example, ev-
idence in Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Lin and Howe (1990) suggests
that insider transactions are profitable. However, our trading strategy does
not make use of any private information. Our strategy uses public informa-
tion concerning ownership, and this ownership information should be priced.
Possibly the most prominent explanation for managerial ownership is based
on the idea of private benefits of control (see, e.g., Jensen and Meckling
(1976), Grossman and Hart (1980), Jensen (1986), and Morck, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1988)). If a CEO owns a significant fraction of her firm’s shares, she
can become entrenched and eventually consume private benefits of control.
Thus, it may be in her self interest to invest in her firm. Following this ar-
gument, firm value should decrease if a CEO is substantially invested in a
firm. Finally, Malmendier and Tate (2005) show that CEOs are often prone
to overconfidence. If they are overconfident with respect to their own ability
to increase firm value, they may heavily invest in their own firms. However,
overconfident CEOs also undertake too risky or even negative NPV projects.
This reduces firm value. The private benefits of control argument as well as
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the overconfidence argument should lead to lower firm value. However, these
arguments do not imply that this effect cannot be priced: the value decreas-
ing effect of the CEO should be anticipated, the shares should be priced
at a discount, and the long term abnormal returns for these firms should
eventually be zero. Even if this effect would not be anticipated by market
participants, it would lead to negative rather than positive abnormal re-
turns. All alternative explanations for high managerial ownership discussed
above are not consistent with higher returns of owner CEO firms.
While our results may help to understand why managers invest in their
own firms, it is far more puzzling to understand why the market does not
(or cannot) price the existence of an owner manager. The share of stocks
owned by top executives is public information and easily observable for mar-
ket participants. So, why is this information not immediately priced? There
are three main potential explanations for this finding. First, the abnormal
returns we document might be a compensation for a high loading of manage-
rial ownership firms on a systematic risk factor that is yet unknown. Second,
the market may be inefficient and not able to correctly interpret managerial
ownership information. Third, recent theoretical models of the stock market
that depart from Walrasian equilibrium concepts can also explain such ab-
normal returns. In traditional models that examine Walrasian equilibria, it is
assumed that the stock market is perfectly competitive. In these models the
existence of an owner manager would be priced (see, e.g., Admati, Pfleiderer,
and Zechner (1994), and more recently DeMarzo and Urosevic (2006)). Von
Lilienfeld-Toal (2006) and Blonski and von Lilienfeld-Toal (2006) give up
the assumption of perfectly competitive stock markets and model strategic
interactions between non-atomistic investors in a game-theoretic setting.2
2Recent figures from the Conference Board show that up to 70% of all U.S. equities are
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In this case, equilibrium prices do not necessarily reflect expected value en-
hancing activities of owner managers (see also Gorton and He (2006)). If
they would reflect the future effort of a CEO in a perfectly liquid market,
this CEO could profit from the price increase right away by selling her stocks
even before carrying out the value increasing activity and bearing the effort
costs associated with this. Obviously, this cannot be a rational equilibrium.
However, there exist rational equilibria with CEO ownership in which stock
prices do not fully reflect future CEO effort, i.e., in which stocks should
earn positive abnormal returns. In this sense, managerial ownership and
abnormal returns are jointly and endogenously determined.
Irrespective of whether the market is inefficient in the sense of being
unaware of the value increasing effect of a CEO with high managerial own-
ership, or whether abnormal returns are a compensation for managerial ef-
fort in a rational equilibrium, one necessary assumption has to hold: CEOs
have to have some influence on firm policies and eventually performance.
Consequently, we expect abnormal returns to be higher among firms with
high managerial ownership and in which managerial discretion is high. We
do indeed find that the difference between returns of firms with and without
managerial ownership is mainly driven by firms in which managerial discre-
tion is high: abnormal returns of owner-CEO firms are most pronounced for
firms from industries that have been shown, e.g., in Wasserman, Nohria, and
Anand (2001), to be characterized by high managerial latitude of action, and
in young firms, high-growth firms, and firms in which CEO tenure is high.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the
data and detail our methodology. Section 3 presents our main results, while
now held by institutional investors, suggesting that the U.S. stock market is not atomistic
and that not all investors are price takers.
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Section 4 contains a discussion of these results. Section 5 explores the role
of managerial discretion, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical Study
2.1 Data
Our primary data sources are the Center of Security Prices (CRSP) monthly
stocks database,3 the Compustat database, and the Standard and Poor’s Ex-
ecucomp Database. Security prices and stock returns are taken from CRSP
and accounting data are from Compustat. Additionally, we use the Exe-
cucomp data to gather information on shareholdings of the highest paid
executives in each firm.4
Execucomp provides information on the highest paid officers for each
firm that has been in the S&P 1500 index since the end of 1994. For S&P
500 firms, the history goes back to 1992. Execucomp backfills data of firms
that enter the S&P 1500 index for the first time. As a result, using the
entire Execucomp database would create a survivorship bias. To avoid this
problem, we limit ourselves to those firms that were members of the historical
constituency lists of the S&P 500 and the S&P 1500 for the end of each year
as taken from Compustat. Compustat provides the constituency lists for the
S&P 1500 index for the end of each year starting in 1994. Our data ends in
2003. We also employ subsamples where we only examine S&P 500 firms. In
3Source: CRSPTM, Center for Research in Security Prices. Graduate School of Business,
The University of Chicago. Used with permission. All rights reserved (crsp.uchicago.edu).
4This is usually the CEO. In rare cases, the highest paid executive is not the CEO. In
order to avoid confusion and complexity of expressions, we use the term owner CEO and
owner manager as synonyms for the officer with the highest fraction of firm ownership.
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these cases we can use all firms that were members of the S&P 500 at the
end of the years 1992 to 2003.
Matching the Execucomp data with the CRSP and the Compustat uni-
verse gives us ownership information for 15,600 firm years (97.5% of the
theoretically maximum firm years – the remaining firm years are missing
due to matching problems)5 from a total of 2,405 different firms.
The relevant data item in the Execucomp database is Shrownpc, which
gives the percentage of the firm’s shares owned by an officer.6 Table 1
describes the distribution of the fraction of the company’s shares owned by
the largest shareholder among the officers covered by Execucomp.
+ + + Please insert TABLE 1 about here + + +
Approximately one out of five S&P 500 firms have an officer who owns
a positive amount of shares (Panel A). The fraction of S&P 500 firms that
have a CEO who owns more than 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares ranges
5To make sure that our results are not influenced by matching problems, we also
employ the dataset described in Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers, and Metrick (2006),
which provides ownership information for 7,873 firm years between 1996–2001 from the
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). Our main results using this alternative
data source are very similar (see Table 4, Panel D).
6Our results are unaffected if we restrict our analysis to non-restricted shares. We
construct a measure of ownership of unrestricted shares similar to the Shrownpc measure.
The results we obtain are very similar in economic as well as statistical terms. However,
our measures of the fractions of unrestricted shares is plagued by a data problem, because
the reporting dates for unrestricted shares and the reporting dates of outstanding shares
do not always conincide. Thus, we decided not to report them. Furthermore, creating
portfolios solely based on option ownership does not provide any significant abnormal
returns.
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from a low of 7% in 1992 to nearly 10% in 1999. There are substantially more
owner CEOs within the S&P 1500 firm universe (Panel B). Approximately
every second firm has a CEO who is invested in the firm, and well above
10% of firms have a CEO who owns more than 5% of the firm in each sample
year. There are only a few CEOs that own more than 50% of a S&P 1500
firm, and there is only one instance in which a manager owns more than
50% of a S&P 500 firm.
2.2 Construction of Portfolios
We construct portfolios based on ownership data in order to test whether
or not these portfolios would have earned abnormal returns. Portfolios are
constructed based on publicly available information about managerial own-
ership and are reset at the beginning of each year. For each year t, our initial
full universe to choose firms from is the constituency list of the S&P 1500
(or S&P 500) at the end of year t − 2. For example, a firm qualifies to be
in a portfolio in the year 1994 if it was a member of the S&P 500 index
at the end of 1992. Firms that were members of the S&P 500 at the end
of 1992 filed their ownership data during 1993. We only start to invest at
the beginning of 1994. This ensures that the ownership information for the
universe of investable firms is public information. Thus, all portfolios are
constructed using public information only. This ensures that our results are
not driven by announcement effects.
Using the methodology described above, we construct value-weighted
portfolios consisting of firms in which the manager with the highest owner-
ship owns more than a specific cutoff fraction of the company’s stocks. We
use 5%, 7.5%, 10%, 12.5%, and 15% of managerial ownership as alternative
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cutoffs to define our test portfolios.
2.3 Factor Model
In estimating abnormal returns, we use the Carhart (1997) four factor model
to adjust for the influence of the systematic risk factors of Fama and French
(1993) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993):
Ri,t −Rb,t = αi + βi,M · (RM,t −RF,t) + βi,SMB · SMBt
+βi,HML ·HMLt + βi,WML ·WMLt + εi,t, (1)
where the dependent variable is the excess return of portfolio i in month
t, Ri,t, over the return of some benchmark in the same month, Rb,t. In
our basic tests we will use the risk-free asset as benchmark, i.e., Rb,t = RF,t.
RM,t−RF,t denotes the excess return of the market portfolio over the risk-free
rate. SMB is the return difference between small and large capitalization
stocks. HML is the return difference between high and low book-to-market
stocks. WML is the return difference between stocks with high past returns
and stocks with low past returns.7
The market portfolio and the SMB, HML, andWML factors are based
on the entire CRSP universe of stocks. We first want to make sure that
Model (1) captures the relevant risk factors for our universe of investable
stocks, which consists of all S&P 500 and S&P 1500 stocks, respectively.
Therefore, we analyze whether it correctly prices portfolios containing all
of these stocks. If the model is correctly specified, the intercept αi in (1)
should not be statistically significant different from zero.
7The market, the size, and the value portfolio returns were taken from Kenneth French’s
Web site: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french, while the mo-
mentum factor was kindly provided by Mark Carhart.
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The S&P 1500 stock returns start at the beginning of year 1996. In
contrast, the S&P 500 stock returns are reported for the time period
starting at the beginning of 1994. Both end in December 2005, because the
last ownership information we have available is from the end of 2003. Our
last one-year investment based on this information starts at the beginning
of 2005. The asymmetric treatment of S&P 500 firms and S&P 1500 firms
is due to data availability (see Section 2.1) and is maintained throughout
the paper. Estimation results for portfolios consisting of all S&P 500 and
S&P 1500 stocks, respectively, are presented in Table 2.
+ + + Please insert TABLE 2 about here + + +
They show that regressing value-weighted portfolio returns on the four
factors yields no abnormal returns if our entire firm universe is used. This
suggests that Model (1) generally captures all relevant and priced factors
for our universe and it can be used to analyze portfolios consisting of stocks
that belong to this universe.
3 Managerial Ownership and Stock Market Per-
formance
To test for the relationship between the percentage share of stocks owned
by the manager and stock market performance, we examine portfolios that
only include firms in which the percentage of firms held by officers exceeds a
certain threshold. We then explore the robustness of our results by employing
different methodological approaches, by looking at alternative samples, and
by conducting a multivariate examination.
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3.1 Portfolio Evidence
Table 3 reports the estimation results using portfolios with various cutoffs
for managerial ownership.
+ + + Please insert TABLE 3 about here + + +
In Panel A, the results for value-weighted portfolios of S&P 1500 firms
for various cutoffs of managerial ownership over the period 1996 to 2005
are presented. For a cutoff of 5%, we find a positive estimate for αi that is
statistically significant at the 5% level. We find economically significant ab-
normal monthly returns of 0.68%, which translates into an annual abnormal
return of 8.52%. This result is even stronger if we examine portfolios with
higher cutoffs for managerial ownership. It increases to abnormal returns of
12.1% p.a. for a cutoff of 10% and to over 16% for a cutoff of 15%.8 For
these higher cutoffs, abnormal returns are statistically significant at the 1%
level.
These results carry over to the S&P 500 firm universe, where we can
examine the longer period from 1994 to 2005 (Panel B). In this case, we
find abnormal returns of 9.73% p.a. for the 5% cutoff and abnormal returns
of 13.2% p.a. for the 10% cutoff. With the exception of the 15% cutoff, the
effect is always stronger than for the S&P 1500 firms in Panel A.
Overall, these results are highly significant in economic as well as statis-
tical terms. They suggest that one would have earned abnormal returns of
well above 10% p.a. by investing in firms with high managerial ownership
8We do not report results for higher cutoffs, as the number of firms that enter our
portfolio gets relatively small in these cases. For extremely high cutoffs, e.g., 25% or
higher, we are not able to find any statistically significant coefficients anymore.
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solely based on public information.
3.2 Robustness Checks
We employ several robustness checks to test the stability of our results. The
empirical results for all of these robustness checks can be found in Table 4.
+ + + Please insert TABLE 4 about here + + +
3.2.1 Difference Portfolios
Instead of looking at long-only portfolios, we now examine a strategy of going
long in managerial ownership portfolios and at the same time short in non-
managerial ownership portfolios. Thus, we re-estimate Model (1), where we
set Rb,t equal to the return of a value-weighted non-managerial ownership
portfolio. Although the results for the long-only strategy presented above
are already significant, we examine difference portfolios because this is a
standard approach in empirical asset pricing, allowing us to test the stability
of our results and to relate them to comparable studies also using long-short
portfolios. Results are presented in Panel A of Table 4.
They confirm our results for the long-only portfolios. Going long in the
5% cutoff (10% cutoff) portfolio and short in the non-managerial ownership
portfolio delivers abnormal annual returns of 7.81% (11.31%) that are statis-
tically significant at the 5% (1%) level. The extent of the abnormal returns
is very similar to that of the long-only strategies. This shows that investors
who are not allowed to short-sell could also fully profit from the abnormal
returns of managerial ownership firms in the past.
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3.2.2 Industry Adjusted Returns
It is possible that the abnormal returns we document are not caused by man-
agerial ownership but rather by an unequal industry distribution of firms
with high managerial ownership and firms with low managerial ownership.
As managerial ownership indeed is not equally distributed across all indus-
tries, adjusting firm returns by industry returns will capture some of the
positive effect of managerial ownership on stock returns. However, we still
expect positive albeit smaller abnormal returns for our managerial owner-
ship portfolios even after industry adjustment, because not all firms in the
respective industries will be characterized by high CEO ownership. Results
for the industry-adjusted portfolios based on Fama-French industry classi-
fications are presented in Panel B of Table 4.9 For 5% and 10% managerial
ownership portfolios we still find statistically significant abnormal returns
of 7.9% p.a. and 11.5% p.a., respectively. This supports the idea that indus-
tries capture some of the managerial ownership effect on returns. However,
even after taking this effect into account, we can still document significant
abnormal returns.
9We carry out the industry adjustment by subtracting the industry return from each
individual firm return before constructing our portfolios. Technically, the managerial own-
ership portfolios then consist of the same stocks as before. Additionally, for each firm there
is an industry hedge term. It essentially is a short position in a portfolio consisting of all
stocks in the same industry as the firm and which is equal in size to the stock’s weight in
the portfolio. It is sometimes argued that adjusting returns based on the Fama and French
(1993) industry classification of firms might lead to misleading results, especially during
the U.S. tech bubble. Thus, we use an alternative industry adjustment based on two-digit
SIC-codes. Results (not presented) are very similar to those obtained using the Fama and
French (1993) industry classification.
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3.2.3 Temporal Stability
Our sample period contains the years of the technology bubble. To exam-
ine whether our results are driven by the building up of the bubble or its
bursting, we split our sample in two parts. The first part contains observa-
tions from 1996 to February 2000, the month in which the markets peaked,
and the second part contains observations from March 2000 till the end of
2004.10 Results are presented in Panel C. They show that our results are
not driven by a specific time period like the building up or the bursting of
the high-tech bubble.11
3.2.4 Alternative Sample
While merging our different data sources, some firms could not be matched
(see Section 2.1). Although the number of non-matched firms is very small,
this could still create some kind of selection bias. To control for this, we
alternatively use data from Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers, and Metrick
(2006) (DFGM).12 They provide ownership information on 7,873 firm years
over the time period from 1996 to 2001. Their database is drawn from the
universe of firms covered by publications of the Investor Responsibility Re-
search Center (IRRC). DFGM provide information on all blockholders, i.e.,
10Results are very similar if we split our sample period in two subsamples of equal
length.
11For reasons of direct comparability with our results from the broader S&P 1500 uni-
verse, we also compute abnormal returns for managerial ownership portfolios drawn from
the S&P 500 universe for the years 1996 to 2004. They are presented in the last row in
Panel C and are very consistent with results obtained using the slightly longer 1994 to
2006 time period.
12We thank Andrew Metrick for providing this data on his Web page
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/ metrick/data.htm.
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large shareholders of firms that own more than 5%. Apart from the name
and the shareholdings, DFGM also characterize the blockholders as officers,
if they were officers of the corresponding firms in the respective year. We
also use the information of ownership and whether or not the blockholder
is also an officer of the firm. We construct portfolios similar to the proce-
dure employed above.13 Since the DFGM data covers a substantially shorter
sample period, we consider two different time periods. The first short time
period is 1996 to 2001, which is also used by DFGM. As findings based on
such a short time period might not be reliable, we also analyze the longer
time period from 1996 to 2004. To do so, we simply assume that ownership
levels stay constant from 2001 to 2004.
Panel D of Table 4 shows results based on this alternative sample. They
are similar to the ones presented above using our sample. For example, the
10% cutoff portfolio now generates abnormal returns of 15.17% p.a. for the
period from 1997 to 2005. This number is even higher at 23.70% p.a. for
the 1997 to 2002 period. Although statistically significant at the 1% level,
this very large number has to be treated with some caution as it is based
on a very short investment horizon. Nevertheless, these results suggest that
the abnormal returns documented before are not due to data problems and
carry over to other data sources.
13There are some necessary adjustments. The data of DFGM are somewhat differently
organized. Each firm of their 1996 sample issues ownership information during the year
1996. As a result, all ownership information of the 1996 firms was public information by
the beginning of the year 1997. Consequently, our portfolios invest in firms of the DFGM
year t at the beginning of year t+ 1.
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3.2.5 Equal-Weighted Returns
Our results presented so far are based on value-weighted portfolios. Thus,
it is possible that they are driven by a small number of large firms. To
examine this possibility, we also investigate the returns of equal-weighted
managerial ownership portfolios. Results are presented in Panel E. We find
similar, albeit somewhat weaker, effects than for value-weighted portfolios.
The abnormal returns we document are still economically and statistically
significant. Consequently, the abnormal returns of high managerial owner-
ship portfolios shown above are not solely driven by a few firms with a very
high market capitalization.
3.2.6 No Rebalancing
Our results are based on a strategy that requires annual rebalancing of
the portfolio. Naturally, this causes some trading costs. However, S&P 1500
stocks are usually quite liquid (and S&P 500 stocks even more so). This sug-
gests that the profits documented above do not vanish when taking trading
costs into account. Nevertheless, as an alternative approach, we also exam-
ine the returns of a completely passive buy and hold strategy. We consider
a portfolio that buys into all 1996 firms with an owner manager who owns
more than 10% without any additional readjustments in the following years.
The monthly (annual) abnormal return of this portfolio amounts to approx-
imately 0.91% (11.44%) and 0.44% (5.35%). Significance drops to the 5%
level (Panel F). Similar results are obtained for the 5% cutoff for managerial
ownership. This shows that even a simple low-cost buy and hold strategy
based on managerial ownership in 1996 would have earned abnormal returns
that are significant in statistical as well as in economic terms.
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3.2.7 Treatment of Missing Returns
Shumway (1997) argues that some asset pricing anomalies could be caused
by problems due to missing returns for some months and firms in the CRSP
database. Firms with missing returns are usually excluded when construct-
ing portfolios. To check whether the abnormal returns we find are due to
these exclusions, we replace every missing return with −1 and include the
respective stock in our portfolio if it qualifies. Results using this extreme as-
sumption to calculate portfolio returns are presented in Panel G of Table 4.
They show that the critique of Shumway (1997) does not apply in our case.
Our results are not driven by the influence of missing return observations.
3.2.8 Constant Portfolio Size
The incentives of a manager to work hard and increase a firm’s value are
primarily determined by the absolute value of her shareholdings.14 This is
the reason why we mainly focus on portfolios in which thresholds of share-
holdings are used as the most important selection criterium. Nevertheless,
some objections may be raised about using specific thresholds since this
creates portfolios that differ over time with respect to the number of firms
included. To counter these objections, we also construct portfolios using the
rank of firms with respect to the shareholdings of the officer with the highest
managerial ownership. Panel H in Table 4 shows that these portfolios also
produce similar abnormal returns to the ones using percentage sharehold-
14To give a precise measure of the manager’s incentives, this number alternatively could
also be related to the manager’s overall personal wealth. Unfortunately, we do not have
information on the manager’s personal wealth outside the firm. However, especially for
the large shares of managerial ownership of 5% or more of the whole company, it is very
likely that the investment in her own firm clearly dominates the personal portfolio.
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ings as cutoff. However, the statistical significance is slightly reduced to the
5% level. With abnormal returns of 12.0% p.a. and 8.8% p.a. for the rank
1–100 and rank 1–250 portfolios, respectively, these results are still highly
economically significant.
3.3 Multivariate Analysis
Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998) report several individual firm
characteristics that can drive returns and are not captured by the four factor
model employed above. In order to explore whether such firm characteristics
might drive returns of firms with high managerial ownership and thus explain
our results, we also run multivariate Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions.
In these regressions we relate monthly raw and industry-adjusted returns of
firms to managerial ownership and further firm-specific characteristics. We
estimate the following regression separately for each month in our sample of
S&P 1500 firms:
Ri,t = αi + βi,1 · Shrown+ βi,2 ·D(10%) + βi,3 · Fi,t + εi,t, (2)
where Ri,t denotes the return (raw or industry adjusted) of firm i in
month t, Shrown is the maximum share of the company’s stock owned by
an officer, D(10%) is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1, if Shrown
is larger than 10%, and Fi,t is a vector of firm characteristics. It includes
the firm characteristics examined in Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam
(1998), and additionally the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) G-index,
five-year sales growth, and S&P 500 inclusion.15 Final parameter values are
15These variables are also used in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). A detailed de-
scription is given in their Appendix 2. Data on the governance index G are taken from
Andrew Metrick’s Web page http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/ metrick/data.htm.
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given by the mean and statistical significance of the time series statistics of
these monthly estimates. Table 5 summarizes the results.
+ + + Please insert TABLE 5 about here + + +
Panel A presents results for raw returns. Column (1) gives the results of
an estimation where we do not include the dummy variable D(10%). The
influence of managerial ownership is positive, but not statistically signifi-
cant. This may be due to the large number of firms where the officer with
the highest managerial ownership only owns a very small fraction of the
company’s stocks (see Table 1). In these instances, incentives to engage in
value-enhancing efforts might be too small. Including the dummy variable
delivers more meaningful results; its influence is large in economic terms.
The point estimate of 0.65 (together with the estimate of −0.02 for the lin-
ear influence of Shrownpc) indicates that firms where one officer owns at
least 10% of the company’s shares deliver annual abnormal returns of 5.5%.
The influence of the 10% dummy is significant at the 5% level. The last two
columns summarize results using industry adjusted returns as dependent
variables. Consistent with the results from the portfolio approach, abnormal
returns are slightly lower now, as indicated by the point estimate of 0.6 for
the influence of the 10% dummy. They are still statistically significant at the
5% level. Overall, these results show that firms with a manager who owns
a large fraction of the company’s stocks outperform other firms even after
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) also use institutional ownership as a control variable.
We do not have this data item available. However, in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003),
the influence of institutional ownership is never significant. Thus, we do not expect that
this omission influences our results.
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controlling for the influence of other firm characteristics. This confirms our
results from the portfolio strategies.
4 Discussion of Results and Potential Explana-
tions
Based on our empirical findings, we will now discuss several potential
explanations for the reported abnormal stock returns.
4.1 Liquidity and Liquidity Risk
Liquidity and liquidity risk are important factors determining asset prices.
Amihud and Mendelson (1986a) show theoretically, that illiquid stocks
should deliver higher returns. There is broad empirical evidence support-
ing this prediction (see, e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1986b), Brennan
and Subrahmanyam (1996), and Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam
(1998)). Moreover, as shown by Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003), not only the
level of liquidity but also systematic liquidity risk is priced. While the size
factor captures most of the effect of the level of liquidity on asset prices,
it is likely that the four-factor model used in this paper does not fully
capture the influence of liquidity risk. However, Pa´stor and Stambaugh
(2003) report that liquidity risk is more important for smaller firms. Thus,
if the abnormal returns documented above would be a remuneration for
low levels of liquidity or for liquidity risk, we would expect that abnormal
returns are more pronounced for the smaller firms in our samples. However,
the abnormal returns we find in the portfolio analysis are usually more
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pronounced for S&P 500 firms than for S&P 1500 firms. This suggests that
the abnormal returns are not (only) caused by illiquidity or liquidity risk,
because the stocks in the S&P 1500 are clearly smaller than those in the
S&P 500.16 Furthermore, in our multivariate analysis we control for firm
size and trading volume which can be interpreted as proxies for liquidity.
While it would be preferable to add more elaborate proxies for liquidity
and liquidity risk as control variables in our multivariate examinations,
lack of data availability refrains us from doing so. However, the level of
the abnormal returns we document seems to be too high to be explained
by a renumeration for liquidity or liquidity risk, especially in the case of
S&P 500 stocks, which are generally assumed to be some of the most liquid
stocks available.
4.2 Limits to Arbitrage
It is possible that market participants are aware of the abnormal returns
we document but cannot profit from this anomaly due to limits of arbitrage
(Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). In that case, the anomaly can persist although
market participants are aware of its existence. However, this is not likely to
explain our findings, as it is not even necessary to short sell stocks in order
to profit from the abnormal returns offered by firms with high managerial
ownership (see Section 3.2.1).
16We also examine abnormal returns across size quintiles. Results (not supported) show
no clear influence of firm size on the extent of abnormal returns generated by managerial
ownership portfolios.
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4.3 Systematic Risk Factors
Traditional asset pricing theory argues that abnormal returns must be
a compensation for bearing some additional risk. While we control for
the standard systematic risk factors identified in the empirical literature,
there might be some additional risk of investing in firms with high CEO
ownership. By definition, the fate of a firm in which the CEO matters a
lot depends on the personality of the CEO. There is some risk related to
this, e.g., in the case of a sudden CEO death. However, to the extent that
such events like CEO deaths are probably not strongly correlated across
firms, this risk is idiosyncratic. Since our portfolios are large (depending
on the thresholds, more than 100 or 200 firms), idiosyncratic risk is not
crucial and only systematic risk factors should matter. Of course, it is still
possible that other systematic risk factors drive our results. To offer an
explanation for the abnormal returns we document, such factors would
have to be highly correlated with the very characteristics firms with high
CEO ownership have (and that we do not control for yet). While this
is, of course, possible, we are not aware of a likely candidate for such a factor.
4.4 Market Inefficiency
The abnormal returns may be a sign of a market inefficiency. Market par-
ticipants might not be aware of the positive effect of managerial ownership
on stock returns. Our results are based on a long term investment strategy.
This would imply that the market is not only inefficient in the short run,
but also that the market does not learn from the mistakes it once made.
We do not know any prior studies that investigate returns of firms with
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high managerial ownership. Thus, investors might indeed not be aware of
this effect. Given that information on managerial ownership was easily
available to investors during our sample period and the abnormal returns
we document are quite substantial, this is surprising.
4.5 Compensation for Effort
It is also possible that the abnormal returns are a remuneration for effort
costs of CEOs. Blonski and von Lilienfeld-Toal (2006) and von Lilienfeld-
Toal (2006) depart from the traditional Walrasian equilibrium concept em-
ployed in earlier studies, e.g., Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner (1994) and
DeMarzo and Urosevic (2006). They discuss the implications of a large and
value increasing shareholder for asset pricing. The novel idea in these pa-
pers is that the existence of a value increasing CEO who is at the same
time a large shareholder is not fully priced in equilibrium. The basic intu-
ition driving this effect is as follows: by exerting value increasing effort, the
owner manager produces a kind of public good for all other investors in this
firm. While all outside investors profit from the value increasing activity the
owner manager may undertake, it is the owner manager alone who has to
bear the (private) effort costs. Moreover, owner managers typically bear ad-
ditional private costs due to holding an undiversified portfolio. As a result,
the owner manager has strong incentives to sell shares whenever the share
price anticipates the equilibrium level of her value increasing effort. In this
case, selling the shares would be optimal for the manager: she can benefit
from the increased stock price—which would then already reflect her future
value-increasing effort—without having to bear the costs of exerting this
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effort. Clearly, this situation cannot be an equilibrium.
In contrast, it may constitute a Nash equilibrium if shares trade below
the expected equilibrium value (see, e.g., von Lilienfeld-Toal (2006)). In this
equilibrium, outside investors fear to bid up the share price to its expected
equilibrium value because bidding up the price will trigger the owner man-
ager to sell her shares.17 Consequently, it may be in the interest of investors
not to bid up the share price but to trade below this value. Long run positive
abnormal returns are the natural consequence. This line of reasoning hinges
on three main assumptions:
1. Non-atomistic stock market
In order for underpricing equilibria to exist, not all investors in the
stock market can be atomistic price takers (see, e.g., Gorton and He
(2006) and von Lilienfeld-Toal (2006)). Stock market participants are
assumed to be price takers in traditional asset pricing models. This
assumption might be questionable in modern stock markets. In recent
years there is an increasing trend towards institutional stock owner-
ship. Sias and Starks (1998) report that institutional ownership in U.S.
equities rose from 24.2% in 1980 to nearly 50% in 1994. More recent
numbers provided by the Conference Board suggest that by the end
of 2005 nearly 70% of the 1,000 largest U.S. companies were held by
institutions.18 Many of those hold significant shares of the companies
they invest in. Consequently, it seems plausible that not all investors
are price takers. While the market microstructure literature has long
recognized that not all market participants are price takers (see, e.g.,
17Gorton and He (2006) analyze similar issues in private bilateral bargaining situations.
18Press release by the Conference Board, Jan 22, 2007.
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Kyle (1985)), this idea is relatively novel to the asset pricing litera-
ture. Given that the share of institutional investors is higher in S&P
500 firms than in S&P 1500 firms, our finding of stronger abnormal
returns of firms with high managerial ownership among the first is in
line with this argument.
2. Rational equilibrium behavior
The empirical prediction of the argument is that firms with a value in-
creasing large shareholder will be characterized by abnormal returns in
a rational equilibrium, because her existence cannot be fully priced. In-
stitutional investors are viewed as more rational than retail investors
(see, e.g., Boehmer and Kelley (2005)). Given that institutional in-
vestors mainly invest in large, liquid stocks like the ones we examine,
it is likely that participants in these markets are rational. However,
demands on investors’ rationality are very high for this equilibrium
to emerge: investors have to be aware of their actions and the con-
sequences of their potential selling to an owner CEO in a relatively
complex strategic setting. Thus, the requirements with respect to the
rationality of market participants might be too demanding and not
fulfilled in existing stock markets.
3. Value increasing large shareholder
Most importantly, it is assumed that owner managers can increase the
value of their firm. While there was some debate in the management
science literature whether CEOs can actually influence the policies and
performance of their firms (see, e.g., Hannan and Freeman (1989) and
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996)) for several years, this view is now
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widely accepted in the more recent economics and finance literatures
(see, e.g., Bertrand and Schoar (2003)). Hence, interpreting CEOs as
value increasing large shareholders is in line with findings of previous
empirical studies.
If the abnormal returns we find are really due to value increasing CEOs,
we should find a stronger effect in such firms where CEOs have more dis-
cretionary power to influence firm policies and eventually firm performance.
The effect should be stronger irrespective of whether it is explained by mar-
ket inefficiency or by compensation for effort in a rational equilibrium. We
will now take a closer look at this issue.
5 The Role of Managerial Discretion
It is likely that managerial discretion varies across industries and across
firms depending on firm characteristics. The literature provides some
guidance where to expect larger CEO effects. Several studies try to
identify specific industries in which CEOs seem to matter most for firm
value and operational performance (see, e.g., Hambrick and Abrahamson
(1995) and Wasserman, Nohria, and Anand (2001)). We expect managerial
ownership portfolios to outperform most in these industries. Johnson,
Magee, Nagarajan, and Newman (1985) find that executives are relatively
more important in firms with strong past sales growth, while Benned-
sen, Pe´rez-Gonza´lez, and Wolfenzon (2007) find a positive impact of a
CEO’s tenure on her power within the firm. Finally, it is also reasonable
to assume that CEOs have more discretion in younger firms than in
very old firms with long-standing and eventually rigid organizational
cultures. Consequently, we expect greater outperformance also among firms
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with strong past sales growth, firms with high CEO tenure, and among
younger firms. Table 6 shows the abnormal returns of managerial own-
ership portfolios consisting of firms in which we expect high CEO discretion.
+ + + Please insert TABLE 6 about here + + +
For easy comparison, in the first line the abnormal returns for managerial
ownership portfolios from the whole sample are repeated. In the second and
third line, managerial ownership portfolios are constructed from a sample
of firms that belong to industries in which CEOs matter most for Tobin’s
Q and for returns on assets (ROA), respectively. Wasserman, Nohria, and
Anand (2001) rank two-digit SIC industries according to the impact of the
CEO on these measures. We concentrate on firms that belong to indus-
tries with an above-median value for the impact of the CEO according to
their numbers. Monthly abnormal returns are 1.43% (1.62%) for managerial
ownership above 5% (10%) in the case of high CEO impact on the firm’s
Tobin’s Q, and 1.28% (1.46%) for managerial ownership above 5% (10%) in
the case of high CEO impact on the firm’s ROA. The last three lines contain
results for portfolios drawn from firms with above median sales growth in
the past five years, above median CEO tenure, and below median firm age,
respectively.19 Monthly abnormal returns for the 5% cutoff (10% cutoff) of
managerial ownership for these firms are 0.82%, 1.04%, and 1.02% (1.10%,
1.26%, and 1.32%), respectively. All of these abnormal returns are larger
than those for managerial ownership portfolios based on the whole sample.
19We use data on firm age from the Field-Ritter dataset (Field and Karpoff (2002) and
Laughran and Ritter (2004)), supplemented by firm age as reported in the S&P Public
Company Database.
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This supports the idea that managerial ownership is more important for ab-
normal returns in firms where CEOs matter more than in firms where CEOs
have little managerial discretion.
It is possible that our results are driven by abnormal returns of firms
with these very characteristics or from the very industries for which CEOs
seem to matter most. As argued above, these characteristics possibly reflect
a systematic risk factor that we do not control for yet. This could be the case
if managerial ownership would be particularly high for such firms in which
CEOs matter most, which is not unlikely: CEOs are probably more keen to
invest in their firms if they think they can increase firm value. To examine
this possibility, we also compute the abnormal returns of firms where we
believe CEOs to have a large impact, but where we do not observe managerial
ownership of CEOs at the same time. These results are presented in the
last column of Table 6. In all cases, we find no abnormal returns of these
portfolios. This shows that the power of CEOs to impact firm value leads
to abnormal returns only in combination with managerial ownership. This
also suggests that it is unlikely that our results are driven by an additional
systematic risk factor, as that factor would then have to be unrelated to the
characteristics of firms with high CEO discretion.
Overall, the above discussion shows that the abnormal returns we doc-
ument are most likely due to one of two remaining potential explanations:
they are either a sign of market inefficiencies, or they are explained by recent
theories where abnormal returns emerge in equilibrium as a compensation
for managerial effort. While the latter explanation is assuming a possibly un-
realistically high level of investor rationality, the first explanation assumes
quite limited rationality in the sense that investors do not learn about prof-
itable trading opportunities. At this stage, we are not able to decide which
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view about investor rationality is more appropriate and which explanation
eventually is most likely to explain our findings.
6 Conclusion
We examine the abnormal returns of portfolios constructed based on public
information about managerial ownership. We find that value-weighted port-
folios consisting of S&P 500 stocks in which the CEO holds more than 5% or
10% of the firm’s outstanding shares generate statistically and economically
significant abnormal returns of 9.7% p.a. and 13.2% p.a., respectively. For
S&P 1500 firms the effect is only slightly smaller, with abnormal returns of
8.5% p.a. and 12.1% p.a. for a 5% and 10% cutoff of managerial ownership,
respectively.
These abnormal returns are achieved after controlling for factors known
to drive asset returns like size, book-to-market, and momentum. Our results
are robust and also hold after controlling for further firm-specific character-
istics in a multivariate setting. The outperformance is most pronounced for
firms with high CEO discretion.
On the one hand, these findings provide a rationale for the puzzling
observation that CEOs often hold a large fraction of their own firms despite
the costs of the underdiversification of their personal portfolios this often
implies: they are compensated for this by abnormal positive returns earned
on their investments.
On the other hand, the results presented in this study give rise to a
new puzzle. Namely, why are abnormal returns of firms with high CEO
ownership persistent? We discuss several possible explanations for this. Po-
tentially, they are driven by an additional systematic risk factor that we do
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not control for. However, given that we find no abnormal returns in firms
with the very characteristics of firms with high managerial ownership that
have no owner CEO, and given that CEO individual risk is idiosyncratic,
this explanation seems to be less likely. Rather, the abnormal returns might
either be an indication that markets are not fully informationally efficient,
or they might emerge as compensation for managerial effort in a rational
equilibrium (von Lilienfeld-Toal (2006) and Blonski and von Lilienfeld-Toal
(2006)). Depending on whether we assume investors to be very rational in a
strategic sense, or whether we assume them to be of limited rationality in the
sense of being unable to correctly interpret publicly available information,
one or the other explanation seems to be more likely. Other potential expla-
nations for abnormal returns of owner CEO firms, like limits to arbitrage or
liquidity concerns, appear to be less likely.
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Table 2: Results for All Firms
This table describes estimation results for value-weighted portfolio returns
consisting of all S&P 500 and S&P 1500 sample firms, respectively, using
the four factor Model (1) as described in the main text. Alphas are on
a monthly basis. Standard errors are in parentheses. The number of
months used to estimate the model is given in the last column. ∗∗∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent level, respectively.
Portfolio α RMRF SMB HML Mom. Obs.
S&P 1500 0.08
(0.083)
0.928∗∗∗
(0.02)
−0.071∗∗∗
(0.021)
0.009
(0.027)
−0.039∗∗∗
(0.012)
120
S&P 500 0.132
(0.085)
0.903∗∗∗
(0.022)
0.12∗∗∗
(0.023)
−0.029
(0.029)
−0.048∗∗∗
(0.013)
144
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Table 3: Managerial Ownership Portfolios
This table describes estimation results of the four factor model Model (1)
as described in the main text for value-weighted managerial ownership
portfolios. Portfolios are constructed based on the fraction of the firm’s out-
standing shares owned by the officer with the highest managerial ownership.
The cutoff for managerial ownership of the respective portfolio is based on
the Execucomp data-item Shrownpc and is given in the first column. Stocks
are selected from the S&P 1500 and S&P 500 universe, respectively. Alphas
are on a monthly basis. Standard errors are in parentheses. The number
of months used to estimate the model is given in the last column. ∗∗∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent level, respectively.
Panel A: S&P 1500
Shrown α RMRF SMB HML Mom. Obs.
>5 0.684∗∗
( 0.283 )
1.112∗∗∗
( 0.068 )
−0.136∗
( 0.072 )
−0.396∗∗∗
( 0.092 )
−0.043
( 0.039 )
120
>7.5 0.809∗∗∗
( 0.308 )
1.118∗∗∗
( 0.074 )
−0.188∗∗
( 0.079 )
−0.47∗∗∗
( 0.1 )
−0.05
( 0.043 )
120
>10 0.953∗∗∗
( 0.339 )
1.115∗∗∗
( 0.081 )
−0.239∗∗∗
( 0.087 )
−0.547∗∗∗
( 0.11 )
−0.034
( 0.047 )
120
>12.5 1.121∗∗∗
( 0.385 )
1.201∗∗∗
( 0.093 )
−0.211∗∗
( 0.099 )
−0.546∗∗∗
( 0.125 )
−0.039
( 0.054 )
120
>15 1.261∗∗∗
( 0.42 )
1.163∗∗∗
( 0.101 )
−0.185∗
( 0.107 )
−0.566∗∗∗
( 0.136 )
−0.04
( 0.059 )
120
Panel B: S&P 500
Shrown α RMRF SMB HML Mom. Obs.
>5 0.777∗∗
( 0.314 )
1.031∗∗∗
( 0.079 )
−0.277∗∗∗
( 0.086 )
−0.59∗∗∗
( 0.108 )
−0.085∗
( 0.047 )
144
>7.5 0.893∗∗∗
( 0.335 )
1.033∗∗∗
( 0.085 )
−0.317∗∗∗
( 0.092 )
−0.649∗∗∗
( 0.115 )
−0.091∗
( 0.051 )
144
>10 1.038∗∗∗
( 0.362 )
1.023∗∗∗
( 0.091 )
−0.356∗∗∗
( 0.1 )
−0.725∗∗∗
( 0.124 )
−0.073
( 0.055 )
144
>12.5 1.199∗∗∗
( 0.41 )
1.11∗∗∗
( 0.104 )
−0.31∗∗∗
( 0.113 )
−0.728∗∗∗
( 0.141 )
−0.084
( 0.062 )
144
>15 1.038∗∗∗
( 0.362 )
1.023∗∗∗
( 0.091 )
−0.356∗∗∗
( 0.1 )
−0.725∗∗∗
( 0.124 )
−0.073
( 0.055 )
144
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Table 4: Robustness Checks
This table reports monthly α estimates in % from Model (1) as described
in the main text for value-weighted (Panels A to D and Panels F to
H) managerial ownership portfolios. We report results for managerial
ownership portfolios consisting of S&P 1500 firms with more than 5%
and 10% CEO ownership, respectively (except in the last line in Panel C
and in Panel D). In Panel A, estimation results for difference portfolios
consisting of a long position in the managerial owernship portfolio and a
short position in the no managerial ownership portfolio are reported. In
Panel B, results for industry adjusted managerial ownership portfolios are
presented. Each firm return is adjusted by the return of the Fama-French
industry return of the industry this firm belongs to before constructing
portfolios. Panel C presents results for an estimation based on subsamples.
The first line reports results for a sample period including all months from
January 1996 till February 2002 (the peak of the tech bubble). The second
line contains results for March 2002 till December 2004. The last line
contains results for S&P 500 sample firms for the period January 1996 till
December 2004. In Panel D, instead of using our Execucomp data, we use
ownership data provided by Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers, and Metrick
(2006) (DFGM). We examine managerial ownership portfolios with a cutoff
of 5% and 10% managerial ownership, respectively. In addition to the time
period 1997 to 2002, for which the alternative data is available, we also
examine the period 1997 to 2005, assuming that managerial ownership
remains constant from 2002 to 2005. In Panel E, we calculate portfolio
returns by equal-weighting individual stock returns of the constituent
firms. Panel F presents the results from buy-and-hold strategies, where
the portfolio was set up in 1996 and not readjusted. We examine a
buy-and-hold strategy with a 5% and with a 10% cutoff for managerial
ownership. In Panel G, we present results for the full universe of S&P 1500
firms as well as for managerial ownership portfolios with cutoffs of 5%
and 10% managerial ownership where all missing returns are replaced by −1.
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Table 4: (continued)
In Panel H, portfolios are constructed based on the rank of the managerial
ownership of that officer who owns the highest fraction of the firm’s
outstanding shares. We examine portfolios consisting of the 100 and 250
firms with the highest managerial ownership, respectively. Standard errors
are in parentheses. The number of months used to estimate the model is
given in the last column. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the one, five,
and ten percent level, respectively.
CEO Ownership
Panel A: Difference Portfolios > 5% > 10% Obs.
Long-Short Portfolios 0.629∗∗
( 0.338 )
0.897∗∗∗
( 0.390 )
120
Panel B: Industry-Adjusted Returns
Fama-French Industries 0.639∗
( 0.382 )
0.911∗∗
( 0.439 )
120
Panel C: Temporal Stability
Jan 1996 – Feb 2000 (S&P 1500) 0.660
( 0.463 )
0.934∗
( 0.565 )
50
Mar 2000 – Dec 2004 (S&P 1500) 0.483
( 0.477 )
0.769∗
( 0.421 )
70
Jan 1996 – Dec 2004 (S&P 500) 0.989∗∗∗
( 0.365 )
1.238∗∗∗
( 0.417 )
120
Panel D: Alternative Samples
DFGM 1997–2005 0.885∗∗
( 0.389 )
1.184∗∗
( 0.478 )
108
DFGM 1997–2002 1.366∗∗
( 0.549 )
1.788∗∗∗
( 0.669 )
72
Panel E: Weighting Scheme
Equal Weighted Portfolio 0.238
( 0.159 )
0.381∗∗
( 0.166 )
120
Panel F: No Rebalancing
Buy-and-Hold Returns 0.712∗∗
( 0.311 )
0.907∗∗
( 0.379 )
120
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Table 4: (continued)
CEO Ownership
Panel G: Treatment of Missing Returns > 5% > 10% Obs.
Setting Missing Returns to −100% 0.513∗
( 0.276 )
0.901∗∗∗
( 0.342 )
120
Panel H: Constant Number of Firms Rank 1–100 Rank 1–250 Obs.
Ranking Ownership 0.951∗∗
( 0.414 )
0.707∗∗
( 0.284 )
120
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Table 5: Multivariate Evidence
This table contains the results of Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of
Model (2) as described in the main text. The dependent variable is the indi-
vidual firm’s monthly raw return (Columns 1 and 2) and industry adjusted
return (Columns 3 and 4), respectively. Independent variables are Shrown,
the share of stocks owned by the CEO of the firm; D(10%), a dummy vari-
able that takes on the value one if Shrown is larger than 10%, and zero
otherwise; and the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) G-Index. The re-
maining control variables are the same as used by Brennan, Chordia, and
Subrahmanyam (1998) and Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and are de-
scribed in detail in Appendix 2 of the latter paper. Numbers are in percent.
Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the
one, five, and ten percent level, respectively.
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Table 5: (continued)
Raw Returns Industry-Adjusted Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shrown 0.005
( 0.006 )
−0.020
( 0.012 )
0.012
( 0.008 )
−0.011
( 0.013 )
D(10%) 0.647∗∗
( 0.267 )
0.600∗∗
( 0.294 )
G 0.006
( 0.018 )
0.006
( 0.018 )
−0.007
( 0.028 )
−0.006
( 0.028 )
NASDUM 1.399
( 1.049 )
1.456
( 1.052 )
1.822
( 1.213 )
0.127
( 0.187 )
SP500 0.105
( 0.176 )
0.109
( 0.175 )
0.124
( 0.189 )
1.892
( 1.221 )
LOGBM 0.179∗
( 0.100 )
0.183∗
( 0.100 )
0.220∗
( 0.130 )
0.222∗
( 0.130 )
LOGSIZE −0.268
( 0.205 )
−0.273
( 0.204 )
−0.309
( 0.203 )
−0.313
( 0.202 )
Price −0.001
( 0.002 )
−0.001
( 0.002 )
−0.004
( 0.005 )
−0.004
( 0.005 )
NYDVOL 0.228
( 0.159 )
0.229
( 0.159 )
0.359∗
( 0.195 )
0.360∗
( 0.195 )
NADVOL 0.145
( 0.188 )
0.142
( 0.188 )
0.246
( 0.223 )
0.242
( 0.223 )
Yield −48.653
( 41.526 )
−50.046
( 41.540 )
−45.150
( 44.061 )
−45.877
( 43.951 )
Ret2-3 −0.481
( 0.858 )
−0.507
( 0.861 )
−0.559
( 0.900 )
−0.586
( 0.903 )
Ret4-6 0.038
( 0.685 )
0.040
( 0.687 )
−0.207
( 0.733 )
−0.195
( 0.735 )
Ret7-12 0.361
( 0.448 )
0.384
( 0.448 )
0.042
( 0.498 )
0.071
( 0.498 )
SGROWTH 0.018
( 0.022 )
0.019
( 0.022 )
0.034
( 0.043 )
0.035
( 0.043 )
Constant 2.833∗
( 1.621 )
2.922∗
( 1.612 )
1.076
( 1.639 )
1.146
( 1.629 )
42
Table 6: Impact of CEO Discretion
This table describes estimation results of the four-factor model Model (1)
as described in the main text for value-weighted managerial ownership
portfolios. Portfolios are constructed based on characteristics that proxy
for managerial discretion and on the fraction of the firm’s outstanding
shares owned by the officer with the highest managerial ownership. In the
first row, results using all firms are repeated for easy comparison. In the
second and third rows, selection is based on firms from the industries in
which CEO impact on firm value (Tobin’s Q) and performance (return on
assets, ROA), respectively, as reported in Wasserman, Nohria, and Anand
(2001), is above the median. In the fourth row, firms with above median
sales growth in the past five years are included. In the fifth row, only
firms in which CEO tenure at the respective firm is above the median are
included. In the last row, firms whose age in the respective month is below
the median of all firms are included. The cutoff for managerial ownership
of the respective portfolio is based on the Execucomp data-item Shrownpc
and is given in the first row. Stocks are selected from the S&P 1500
universe. Alphas are on a monthly basis. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The number of months used to estimate the model is always 120. ∗∗∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent level, respectively.
Four-Factor α
CEO Ownership
> 5% > 10% 0%
All Firms 0.6758∗∗
( 0.2708 )
0.9561∗∗∗
( 0.3249 )
0.0552
( 0.0614 )
High Impact Industries (Tobin’s Q) 1.4247∗∗∗
( 0.4767 )
1.6172∗∗∗
( 0.5097 )
0.1234
( 0.1795 )
High Impact Industries (ROA) 1.2772∗∗∗
( 0.4745 )
1.4601∗∗∗
( 0.5171 )
0.0091
( 0.2162 )
Growth Firms (Median) 0.8168∗∗
( 0.3133 )
1.0989∗∗∗
( 0.3686 )
0.0669
( 0.0649 )
High Firm Tenure (Median) 1.0424∗∗∗
( 0.3696 )
1.2623∗∗∗
( 0.4122 )
0.0032
( 0.2591 )
Young Firms (Median) 1.0205∗∗∗
( 0.3528 )
1.3188∗∗∗
( 0.4062 )
0.1695
( 0.2516 )
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